In this paper we develop a Heckscher-Ohlin model of regional integration, designed to investigate the way in which the effects of integration depend on partner country endowments, relative to each other and relative to the world average. We show that the country with the endowment ratio further away from the world average does worse than its partner. And with a natural interpretation of factors, this translates to a CU between two poor countries leading to divergence of their income levels, while a CU between rich countries leads to convergence.
How do the effects of forming a free trade area or customs union (CU) depend on the characteristics of the partner countries? The standard theory of CUs (from Viner (1950) onwards) tells us that the effects of membership are ambiguous, but remarkably little literature is concerned with identifying the underlying characteristics of economies which make them more or less likely to benefit from a CU with each other. 1 We would like to be able to make statements like 'integration between two economies of this type will bring welfare gains, but if one of them is instead of that type, then it will lose, the partner will gain…', and so on. This paper explores the basis for making such statements.
The questions posed above are broad, and are motivated by two particular subquestions. The first is, do we expect partner countries in a CU to converge or diverge in their economic structure and income levels? Empirically, there are quite different experiences that need to be explained. On the one hand, the experience of Portugal, Spain and Ireland in the EU suggests that a CU can yield convergence, enabling poorer countries to catch up with richer members. (Convergence in the EU is documented by Ben-David (1993) ). But on the other, the experience of a number of developing country CUs, suggest that integration has promoted divergence. Perhaps the best documented example of this is the concentration of manufacturing in the old East African Community By showing how the effects of a CU depend on the characteristics of member countries, we are able to shed some light on these episodes.
The second question is, can we offer policy recommendations about the type of partner a country should seek to join a CU with? If we can identify how gains to each of the partners depend on their characteristics, then we will be in a position to prescribe the sorts of combinations of countries for which a CU may raise the welfare of both. Increased trade may accelerate the transfer to technologies (see for example Coe and Helpman (1995) , and the critique of Keller (1996) ). In both these cases whether there are gains to be had depends critically on the characteristics of the integrating countries --whether they have the capacity and commitment to transfer these benefits between countries.
In this paper we abstract from these mechanisms, and concentrate just on trade aspects, remaining, for most of the paper, within a traditional comparative advantage framework. 3 We show how the comparative advantage of member countries -relative to each other and to the rest of the world -determines the relocation of production that takes place when the CU is formed, and the welfare effects of the CU. Our main result is that if two small countries form a CU, while a larger 'rest of the world' remains outside, then the country with endowment vector more similar to that of the rest of the world does better than the country with the more extreme endowment. This is despite the fact that the CU distorts this country's production structure away from the free trade structure. The result is very suggestive of some of the experiences we referred to above -manufacturing being drawn out of Uganda and Tanzania into Kenya, and this benefiting Kenya relative to the other countries. Although the strongest result is on the relative effects on the two countries, we also identify the absolute effects, showing how for some endowment patterns one or both countries may lose, and demarcating regions in which both gain.
We proceed as follows. In the next section we outline a simple Ricardian example to illustrate the main intuition behind our results. We then outline the endowment based model which we develop, and use a series of figures to explore results.
2: A Ricardian example:
To illustrate our main result we start with a Ricardian example. There are two goods, X and Y, and three countries, a large rest of the world (country 0), and two small countries, (1 and 2). advantage (compared to the rest of the world) in good X, but this being greater for country 2 than for 1.
In the initial situation all trade is subject to the same tariffs, and these are high enough to prevent any trade between countries 1 and 2. If either of these countries trade with the rest of the world, it will take the form of exporting X and importing Y, so private incentives in these countries are given by line p o T, where T is the ad valorem tariff factor.
At these prices only country 2 trades, specializing in production of X, and consequently being able to consume along the world price line, at a point such as A 2 . Country 1 does not trade, so must consume on its production possibility frontier, at a point such as A 1 .
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Now, consider the effects of a CU between countries 1 and 2. If these countries trade with each other but not with the rest of the world, then internal prices will settle at some level such as p*, with country 2 specializing in production of X and country 1 in production of Y. At these prices will it be profitable to trade with the rest of the world?
Not if good Y is available domestically at less than its external import price, i.e., p* < p o T , which is the case illustrated. The equilibrium therefore involves countries 1 and 2 trading with each other, but not with the rest of the world. The corresponding consumption levels are at points such as B 1 and B 2 , along the budget lines supported by specialized production and trade at relative price p*. We see that country 1 benefits from formation of the CU (it consumes at point B 1 compared to A 1 ) but country 2 loses, going from A 2 to B 2 .
This example makes the point which we develop in a more general context in following sections. The country which has comparative advantage relatively close to the rest of the world gains from CU membership, relative to the country with the more extreme comparative advantage. In this example -and some cases we will see later -the result is not just in terms of relative gains, but also absolute gains and losses; the extreme country loses and the intermediate one gains. Notice also that this is despite the fact that production in the intermediate country moves 'in the wrong direction'; with multilateral free trade both countries 1 and 2 would specialize in production of X, but the CU induces 1 to specialise in production of Y.
3: A factor endowment based model:
The main model we develop is one in which all countries have the same technology, but have different endowments of two factors, which we refer to as skilled and unskilled labour, S and U. The rest of the world is large, and is endowed with equal quantities of these two factors.
5 Countries 1 and 2 may have factor endowments different from each other, and from the rest of the world, and these differences will be the focus of our analysis.
Each country can produce three goods. One is a non-tradable, and uses S and U symmetrically (so has isoquants symmetric around the 45 o line). The other two are tradable, and we call them X and Y, assuming that Y is relatively S intensive and X is U intensive. Each of these goods is differentiated by location of production -an Armington assumption. We impose this purely for computational convenience in what follows (without it the model goes to corners and there is discontinuous behaviour) and set the amount of product differentiation at a minimal level --the elasticity of substitution between products from different locations is 60 in the examples that follow. Also, for ease of interpretation, we impose symmetry between the X and Y products, assuming that they take the same share in consumption, and that the factor intensity of the X industry is the reciprocal of that of Y industry. Amongst other things, this has the effect of fixing the rest of the world's relative price of Y to X at unity.
In the initial equilibrium the same tariff rate is in place on all imports, regardless of source, destination, or commodity type. The experiment we study is the removal of the tariff between countries 1 and 2, and we want to see how the effects of this depend on the endowments of the two countries. To do this we plot out results on a figure, the axes of which give the country 1 and 2 factor endowments. The horizontal axis of figure 2 measures S 2, country 2's endowment of S; we assume that its endowments of S and U sum to 2, so the axis also measures 2 -U 2 ; 6 at the midpoint, S 2 = U 2 = 1; at the lower end S 2 = 0.5, U 2 = 1.5, and at the upper end S 2 = 1.5, U 2 = 0. 
Industrial relocation between similar economies:
To draw more out of this structure, let us return to our original motivation, to explore convergent and divergent behavior of integrating economies. Consider two economies -say Uganda and Kenya -with comparative advantage, relative to the world, in agriculture. In the initial situation they both also produce some manufactures, largely because high tariffs create incentives to meet local demand by import substitution.
Suppose further that Kenya has an advantage, relative to Uganda, in production of manufactures; this might be because of endowment differences, or alternatively because of technical differences, or advantages created by transport or geographical differences.
What happens if these two economies form a CU? Manufacturing activity will be drawn from Uganda to Kenya, which uses its advantage to supply Ugandan consumers with manufactures. Kenya therefore has expansion of its manufacturing -the activity in which it has a comparative advantage relative to Uganda but comparative disadvantage relative to the rest of the world --while Uganda loses manufacturing and adopts a production pattern more in line with its comparative advantage with the rest of the world.
This intuitive story is picked up in the model if we consider a point such as A on figure 2. Kenya is country 1, Uganda country 2, and good Y is manufactures -the factor S intensive sector. Production patterns of the two countries are illustrated on figures 3 and 4. The vertical axis of these figures is the share of Y in tradable production in each country, and the horizontal gives combinations of S 1 and S 2 on the line ee in figure 1. For current discussion we look only at points on the vertical lines AA; (these correspond to point A on figure 2). We see, as expected, that the CU causes country 1 to expand its Y production, taking it further away from its full multilateral free trade production shares, while the converse is true for country 2. The CU therefore causes the production structures of the two economies to diverge.
The associated welfare effects are illustrated on figure 5 ; looking along the line AA, we see that country 1 (Kenya, the country moving away from its free trade production structure) gains, while country 2 (Uganda, losing manufacturing production) suffers a welfare reduction. This perhaps seems counter-intuitive, but can be understood by simple trade diversion arguments. Country 2 suffers from trade diversion, as some of its imports of Y from the rest of the world are now being imported from the partner country.
It is helpful to check this argument by asking what happens in the X sector. The answer is the converse -production moves from country 1 to country 2, so causing country 1 some trade diversion. Why does this not reverse the welfare argument we had above? The answer is that the two economies have a comparative advantage, relative to the rest of the world, in X production, but not in Y production. The general point is then that a country is likely to suffer most from trade diversion if its partner expands production of a good in which it does not have comparative advantage relative to the rest of the world.
Exactly the same story can be given a very different interpretation by looking at different points on figure 2 and relabelling economies. Consider point B, and now think of country 1 as Germany and country 2 as Portugal. Both are S abundant relative to the rest of the world, but Germany more so than Portugal. A CU causes Y production (the S intensive good) to move from 2 to 1, and X production to move in the opposite direction.
(See points on the line BB on figures 3 and 4). This raises welfare in 2 (Portugal) but reduces it in 1 (Germany), which is now purchasing its U intensive goods from a country which, though U abundant relative to it, is not U abundant relative to the rest of the world.
These examples illustrate how a CU can cause divergence of the production structures of the integrating economies, with an associated welfare gain for the intermediate economy and loss for the extreme one. To know whether this is divergence or convergence of real income we need to know initial per capita utility levels in the two countries, and this depends on the mapping of endowment quantities into individuals or households. The natural assumption to make is that more skilled labour abundant economies have higher per capita income levels than less skill abundant. In this case we see that CU formation causes real income divergence for low income countries (Kenya and Uganda, with S below world average) and real income convergence for high income countries (Portugal and Germany, with S above the world average).
Finally, note that the discussion so far only relates to cases where both countries are on the same side of the world average. Figures 3 -5 give production and welfare change for all points on the line ee (of figure 2). When countries lie on opposite sides of the world average (as in the central part of figures 3 -5) they may both gain, although it is still the case the country closer to the world average does relatively better.
CU formation
We have seen that there are substantial regions of the endowment space in which one country experiences a reduction in welfare from CU membership. From the point of view of recommending formation of a union, we are interested in whether both countries gain. Our simulations easily allow us to trace out the region within which such Pareto improvements are made, and they are shown in figure 6 for two different initial tariff levels.
The inner cross-shaped area, labeled T = 1.3 is the boundary of the set of Pareto Pareto improvements for a 40% initial and external tariff. The higher is the initial tariff, the greater is the set of endowments which supports Pareto improving integration.
Conclusions:
In this paper we have developed perhaps the simplest full general equilibrium trade model in which it is possible to investigate the effects of preferential integration; a model with two factors, two tradable goods, and three countries. We used it to investigate the way in which the effects of the CU depend on partner country endowments, and whether it causes convergence or divergence of real income. 
